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Direct empirical comparisons between these two components of 
agency are rare (e.g., Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998). At the same 
time, it is unclear which specific processes inform the feeling and 
judgment level and how to best assess these levels. Often empiri-
cal investigations of agency addressed the latter, manipulating the 
predicted sensory consequences of performed movements and then 
asking participants to reflect upon or answer self-other questions 
of the sort “Was it your movement you saw on the screen?” (e.g., 
Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer 
et al., 2003; Leube et al., 2003; MacDonald and Paus, 2003; David 
et al., 2007). Yet, only little is known about empirical indicators for a 
pre-reflective feeling of agency, independent of any verbal report. As 
this feeling, according to Synofzik et al. (2008a,b), is heavily based 
on signals arising from action execution itself, closer inspection 
of all aspects of motor execution, and control appear a promising 
avenue (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; Fourneret et al., 2001; 
Knoblich and Kircher, 2004). What happens, for example, when 
predicted sensory consequences (e.g., via an efference copy) do 
not match the observed action outcome? In a seminal experiment, 
Nielsen (1963) asked his study participants to draw a straight line 
on a piece of paper while observing their movements via a mirror 
system. The experimenter, hidden behind a screen, manipulated this 
visual feedback. He presented his own hand drawing a line, which 
spatially deviated from the participants’ path. As a consequence, 
participants adjusted their line drawing to the false visual feedback, 
neither being aware of the other hand nor the adjustments they had 
made. Later developments of this experiment, which quantified the 
degree of motor adjustment made to false visual feedback (e.g., by 
calculating the root mean squared error) and relating it to verbal 
report, also showed poor conscious access to motor  performance 
IntroductIon
The sense of agency refers to the ability to recognize oneself as the 
author of one’s own actions and distinguish these from actions 
caused or controlled by other sources (Gallagher, 2000). As such, the 
sense of agency is a key component to self-consciousness (Georgieff 
and Jeannerod, 1998; Metzinger, 2003; Synofzik et al., 2008a). But 
what specifically is meant by “sense”? For example, although I am 
typing these letters on the keyboard, I am more or less aware of 
myself as the agent of this writing and thinking. Empirical work 
usually operationalized the sense of agency by self-other action 
recognition paradigms (e.g., Franck et al., 2001; Farrer and Frith, 
2002; Farrer et al., 2003; MacDonald and Paus, 2003; Shergill et al., 
2005; Tsakiris et al., 2005; Balslev et al., 2007; David et al., 2007), 
which imply reflectance upon the actions performed or observed. 
Our daily actions, however, usually happen in an automated way; 
we do not necessarily reflect upon them. Although some authors 
conceptually distinguished between reflective and pre-reflective 
forms of self-consciousness (Gallagher, 2000; Legrand, 2007), only 
recently the concept of the sense of agency underwent a similar 
specification. For example, Synofzik et al. (2008a,b) distinguished 
between a low-level feeling of agency and a higher-level judgment 
of agency: the feeling of agency hinges on pre-reflective, senso-
rimotor processes, whereas the judgment about agency involves 
reflective or attribution-like processes. More specifically, Synofzik 
et al. (2008a,b) proposed a two-step model, according to which 
the feeling of agency arises first, only classifying – albeit not at a 
reflective or meta-representational level – whether oneself was an 
agent or not based on signals from action execution itself (e.g., 
efference copies). Second, the judgment of agency classifies who the 
agent was (similar to Georgieff and Jeannerod, 1998 who system).
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Declaration of Helsinki. Two participants were excluded from 
further analyses of SCR data and another two from HR analyses 
because of continuous noise in the raw signal (thus, physiological 
results refer to N = 9). Before the experiment, each participant 
signed informed consent. Participants were paid an allowance of 
10 €/h.
task
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen in an acous-
tically shielded chamber to perform a simple right-handed joy-
stick (Logitech Attack™ joystick) task. A cursor appearing at the 
lower center of the screen signaled participants to initiate their 
movements toward a target object located at the top of the screen 
(a white asterisk on a black background; Figure 1A). The target 
(pseudo-) randomly appeared either on the upper left or right side 
of the screen. When the target was reached, it was highlighted to 
indicate target and trial completion. Participants received visual 
feedback to their movements (real feedback condition) but were 
told that sometimes they would see the experimenter’s movement, 
who performed the same task outside the chamber (false feedback 
condition). In reality, false feedback represented previous move-
ment trajectories of the participant, randomly selected from a pool 
of recorded trajectories and replayed to the participant (David et al., 
2007, 2008, 2009). A trial ended when the participants or the false 
feedback reached the target (on average at 1.3 s on real or 1.6 s on 
false conditions), after which participants judged via button press 
whether the movement they saw on the screen was self-controlled 
(1), rather self-controlled (2), rather other-controlled (3), or other-
controlled (4). Participants were naïve about the true nature of the 
experiment and believed (assessed by informal post-experimental 
debriefings) that the experimenter performed the same task  outside 
(Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998) or a temporal dissociation of 
motor responses and subjective awareness (i.e., motor adjustments 
occurred before false feedback was detected; Castiello et al., 1991). 
Similar dissociations between motor control and awareness in 
patients (Slachevsky et al., 2001; Bulot et al., 2007; Synofzik et al., 
2008) also offer strong support to the two-step feeling-judgment 
model of agency.
We sought to explore the feeling of agency, testing for further 
pre-reflective indices, and how these relate to judgments of agency 
by verbal report. Particularly, we were interested in evaluating the 
relevance of bodily or peripheral physiological measures for the 
feeling of agency. Esslen et al. (2008) reported that pre-reflective 
self-referential processing was associated with electroencephalog-
raphy activity in areas, which receive homeostatic afferents from 
somatic and visceral sensations of the body such as the insula and 
somatosensory cortex – areas also implicated in the sense of agency 
(e.g., Farrer et al., 2003). Thus, it seemed interesting to investigate a 
class of physiological indices, which do not directly reflect activity 
of the central nervous system but visceral or autonomic nervous 
system (ANS) – a system that functions below the level of conscious-
ness. The ANS controls bodily functions such as heart rate (HR), 
respiration, perspiration or pupil diameter. Despite being functions 
of the ANS, they may also be centrally modulated, for example, by 
stressful or emotional external events (e.g., Malmstrom et al., 1965) 
and have also been employed in psychological research. Amongst 
which, (HR, i.e., the number of heartbeats per unit of time) and 
skin conductance response (SCR; i.e., the electrical conductance 
of the skin resulting from its moisture or perspiration level) can 
be considered the most commonly used indices. SCR refers to the 
phasic increase in conductance in response to a stimulus (Lykken 
and Venables, 1971). Both, SCR and HR, can be modulated by dif-
ferent states of arousal, emotion, and awareness (Bauer, 1984; Hamm 
and Vaitl, 1996; Codispoti et al., 2001; Ruiz-Padial et al., 2005; Weike 
et al., 2007); yet, their role for the sense of agency has not been tested.
Here participants performed simple joystick movements (similar 
to previous agency experiments: Franck et al., 2001; Farrer and Frith, 
2002; David et al., 2007, 2008, 2009) while receiving visual feedback. 
The visual feedback to their movements was sometimes temporally and 
spatially manipulated; participants believed to see the experimenter’s 
movements. Participants then rated whether they or the experimenter 
controlled the visual feedback. The objective of the present study was 
threefold. We sought to identify indices of the sense of agency in addi-
tion to verbal report, while particularly focusing on the relevance of 
physiological activity. More specifically, we investigated if our depend-
ent variables, such as SCR and HR, differed between real and false 
feedback conditions (i.e., between factual agency and non-agency) 
and how they related to the reflective experience of agency. Third, as 
previous evidence (Shoemaker, 1968; Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998; 
Slachevsky et al., 2001; David et al., 2007) suggested that judgments 
of agency could be subject to errors by misidentification, we aimed to 
test which other variables were immune to such errors.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
Eleven right-handed healthy adults (six females; age 19–34 years, 
mean age 25.7 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in the present experiment, in agreement with the 
Figure 1 | (A) A cursor appearing on the lower center of the screen 
signaled the beginning of a trial. Using a joystick, participants then moved 
the cursor to a target stimulus (i.e., asterisk), which randomly appeared on 
the upper left (as shown here) or right corner of the screen. Upon 
completion, the target was highlighted and participants were asked to rate 
whether the movement they saw was self-generated or not. (B) Participants 
received visual feedback that matched their executed movements (real 
feedback) or not (false feedback). Real and false feedback was either 
attributed to the self or another person (i.e., the experimenter), resulting in a 
quasi 2-by-2 factorial design.
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conditions, trial and rating-related parameters, the Presentation 
software sent event-related trigger to a Biopac system (MP100 unit, 
Biopac Systems Inc., CA, USA), which continuously recorded the 
skin conductance and HR.
The SCR was measured in accordance with the procedures 
described in (Fowles et al., 1981). The SCR signal was recorded 
from two Ag–AgCl electrodes on the index and middle finger of 
the left hand. A high impedance electrolyte gel with physiological 
sweat concentrations of sodium chloride (∼0.05 Molar NaCl) was 
used. A constant electric current was applied and the resultant 
current flow (in μS) was measured using the MP100 Biopac unit 
and the amplifier module GSR100C. The SCR signal was bandpass 
filtered (0.05–1 Hz) and sampled at 200 Hz.
The electrocardiogram (ECG) was recorded with the Biopac 
MP100 system and the amplifier module ECG100C after placing 
three electrodes on the left and right inner forearm as well as the 
right lower leg (reference). The ECG signal was bandpass filtered 
(0.5–35 Hz) and sampled at 200 Hz. HR was determined from 
the consecutive R–R intervals of the ECG. The Biopac software 
calculated the interbeat intervals of the ECG using R-top detec-
tion, resulting in a HR series consisting of beats per minute (bpm).
data analyses
BehavIoral data
Dependent behavioral variables comprised (1) agency ratings, 
which primarily addressed the judgment level of agency. To further 
characterize the sense of agency beyond verbal reports, also tapping 
into the sensorimotor feeling of agency, we assessed the (2) time 
participants initiated their movements (i.e., onset RTs), and (3) the 
difference in onset of movement and false feedback. Onset RTs on 
their own have rarely been investigated in agency research despite 
the possibility that participants may, for example, delay their own 
movement to test for false feedback. With respect to onset differ-
ences between false feedback and movement, other authors have 
previously investigated who temporally delayed visual feedback is 
attributed to in terms of agency (e.g., MacDonald and Paus, 2003 
used fixed delays between 60 and 270 ms, Franck et al., 2001 delays 
between 50 and 500 ms, and Farrer et al., 2008 between 50 and 
1100 ms). Dependent behavioral variables are described in Table 1.
PhysIologIcal data
The SCR signal was lowpass-filtered at 5 Hz and baseline-corrected 
(to 500 ms before trial onset). Data were cleaned of artifacts (i.e., 
extreme deflections) by calculating their mean and standard devia-
tion (SD) and excluding all minima or maxima that deviated three 
SD from the mean. Such artifacts or outlier are rather likely to be 
due to technical (e.g., cable movement) or other biological reasons 
(e.g., deep breathing), but do not reflect SCR activity. To distin-
guish stimulus-related SCR from spontaneous activity, the SCR is 
usually analyzed in a response window of 1–5 s (Malmivuo and 
Plonsey, 1995). Thus, any SCR deflection with peak latencies ≤1 s 
was discarded for further analyses. After preprocessing, on average 
88.4% of trials remained and were used for further statistical analy-
ses of SCR. As large inter-individual variability represents a com-
mon limitation of electrodermal measures (Claus and Schondorf, 
1999), data were range-corrected by dividing each individual SCR 
measurement by the participant’s maximum response (Lykken and 
the chamber. Prior to recordings, participants underwent a stand-
ardized introduction and practice trial session in order to get used 
to the trial procedure.
Agency was experimentally manipulated as follows: in 50% of 
trials participants saw the corresponding cursor movement to their 
executed joystick, while the remaining 50% of trials contained false 
feedback (160 trials in total). The direction of movements (i.e., 
left or right-sided target) was pseudo-randomized. The false feed-
back could deviate temporally (with an inherent minimum delay 
of 200 ms) or spatially from the participant’s actual movements 
(Figure 2). Participants were instructed to react (i.e., initiate their 
movements) fast and to avoid jerky or diffuse movements. If par-
ticipants did not move the joystick by 2 s, the trial was aborted. 
The instruction and 2 s rule were employed to prevent participants 
from extremely and voluntarily delaying or distorting their own 
movements in order to detect false feedback. Note that participants 
guided their movements blindly during false feedback but reached 
the target on average in 75% of false feedback trials. Every 20th 
trial participants were given the possibility for a self-paced break. 
The intertrial-interval (i.e., from the end of the rating trials to 
the beginning of the next joystick movement), allowing peripheral 
physiological measures to return to baseline, was jittered, and rand-
omized (10, 12, 16, 18 s). The present paradigm has previously been 
used in a similar form and has also been described in more detail 
by David et al. (2007, 2008, 2009) and Schimansky et al. (2010).
aPParatus and resPonse MeasureMents
The task was programmed and administered using the Presentation 
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA) on a Vision 
Master Pro 514 monitor (Iiyama, model no. HM204DTA). Monitor 
refresh rate was 100 Hz with 1024 × 768 screen resolution. The 
monitor was located 120 cm in front of participants. To code for 
Figure 2 | examples of movement traces plotted against false feedback 
traces from four different trials and two participants. Corresponding 
behavioral and physiological measures are entailed in the figures. x- and 
y-axes represent horizontal and vertical cursor positions on the screen. Targets 
appeared on the left or right upper side of the screen, thus traces to both 
sides are plotted. This figure does not illustrate dynamic differences in speed 
between movement and false feedback, which may have informed agency 
experience.
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Table 1 | Dependent variables for the four feedback-by-rating conditions.
 rS rO∗ FS FO
Number of trials (%) M = 45.9, SD = 5.7 M = 4.4, SD = 5.7 M = 22.7, SD = 6.9 M = 27.0, SD = 6.7
Onset RT (s) M = 0.60, SD = 0.08 M = 0.49, SD = 0.08 M = 0.54, SD = 0.08 M = 0.54, SD = 0.09
Onset diff. feedback/movement (s) n/a n/a M = 0.24, SD = 0.06 M = 0.35, SD = 0.08
SCR (% maximum) M = 13. 2, SD = 6.0 M = 12.6, SD = 6.4 M = 12.9, SD = 6.6 M = 13.5, SD = 7.5
HR change (bpm) M = 0.18, SD = 0.74 M = 0.56, SD = 1.56 M = 0.14, SD = 1.54 M = −0.47, SD = 0.63
M, mean; SD, standard deviations; RS, real feedback attributed to self; RO, real feedback attributed to other (i.e., the experimenter); FS, false feedback attributed to 
self; FO, false feedback attributed to other; RT, reaction time (in seconds); n/a, not applicable; SCR, skin conductance response (percent max. amplitude); HR, heart 
rate.
∗Only data from N = 6.
Figure 3 | Displayed are individual range- (i.e., normalized to the participant’s maximum response) and baseline-corrected SCrs (pre-stimulus baseline 
was at −500 ms) for each condition. Trial onset was at time zero. RS, real feedback rated self; RO, real feedback rated other; FS, false feedback rated self; FO, false 
feedback rated other.
Venables, 1971). These normalized individual SCR are plotted in 
Figure 3. In line with previous research (Bauer, 1984; Hamm and 
Vaitl, 1996; Weike et al., 2007), peak amplitudes (i.e., magnitudes) 
per condition were computed as dependent variable for group 
comparisons (Table 1).
The HR was baseline- and artifact-corrected similar to the SCR. 
As the interbeat interval detection performed by the Biopac system 
was not perfect, trials with bigger jumps in bpm were excluded (if 
a score was 20% bigger/smaller than the preceding score; Kettunen 
and Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 2001). After preprocessing, on average 
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5% was used to correct for multiple comparisons. Third, to test for 
significant relationships between the single measures and accuracy 
of agency judgments (e.g., accuracy and HR), Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient was assessed. All data were analyzed using 
Matlab (The MathWorks, MA, USA) and the statistical software 
package SPSS (SPSS Inc., IL, USA).
results
agency ratIngs
There was a significant main effect of feedback manipulation on 
accuracy of ratings: real feedback was significantly more correctly 
experienced (M = 91.3% correct trials, SD = 11.6%) as opposed 
to false feedback (M = 54.1% correct, SD = 13.8; F(1,20) = 46.84, 
p < 0.001). Table 1 lists the distribution of trials across the four 
feedback-by-rating possibilities.
MoveMent onset
Participants initiated their joystick movements on average at 
592 ms (SD = 101 ms) on real feedback and 545 ms (SD = 86 ms) 
on false feedback trials. There was no main effect of feedback on 
onset RTs (i.e., onset RTs for real vs. false feedback; F(1,20) = 1.36, 
p = 0.257, n.s.). Taking into account how feedback was experi-
enced, participants moved significantly later on real feedback tri-
als that were subsequently attributed to themselves, especially as 
opposed to false feedback that was correctly rated other [RS > FO, 
96.7% of trials remained for subsequent statistical analyses of HR. 
In line with previous HR research, mean changes in HR over time 
(at 0.5 to 4 s post-onset, every 500 ms) were computed for each 
condition and plotted (Codispoti et al., 2001; Ritz et al., 2002; Plesa 
Skwerer et al., 2009). For statistical analyses an average HR score 
over time was calculated as dependent variable (Table 1). Because 
inter-individual variability in physiological activity is usually high, 
we also show individual HR data in Figure 4.
statIstIcal analyses of BehavIoral and PhysIologIcal data
To test the effects of our experimental manipulation on dependent 
variables, a one way MANOVA with the factor Feedback (2 levels: 
real, false) was performed on the dependent variables: accuracy, 
onset RTs, SCR and change in HR. In addition, dependent variables 
were analyzed according to participants’ experience of real and 
false feedback (as self, rather self, rather other, or other). As there 
were unbalanced and empty cells for some participants (only three 
rated real feedback as other, only six rather other) and to reduce the 
amount of multiple comparisons, we collapsed certain and uncer-
tain (e.g., rather self and self) rating bins (see Figure 1B). Onset RTs, 
onset discrepancy between movement and false feedback, SCR and 
changes in HR were then compared across the four conditions real 
feedback rated self (RS), real feedback rated other (RO), false feed-
back rated self (FS), false feedback rated other (FO) using paired 
t-tests. The Bonferroni–Holm procedure with a global alpha level of 
Figure 4 | Displayed are changes in heart rate compared to baseline (pre-stimulus baseline was at −500 ms) in beats per minute for each participant and 
condition over time (averaged over 500 ms time bins). Trial onset was at time zero. RS, real feedback rated self; RO, real feedback rated other; FS, false feedback 
rated self; FO, false feedback rated other.
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accuracy of agency ratIngs
Participants successfully reported real feedback, recognizing 
almost all real feedback trials as self-generated. Their accuracy 
on false feedback trials, however, differed remarkably from this 
near-perfect performance: false feedback was incorrectly judged as 
self-generated on more than half of all false feedback trials. Such 
vicarious agency has been previously reported (Fourneret and 
Jeannerod, 1998; Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; David et al., 2007, 
2008; Schimansky et al., 2010), suggesting a natural bias toward 
the experience of self-agency, on the one hand, or insufficiency of 
verbal reports, on the other. That is, verbal reports may represent 
subjective and inaccurate measures because they can be subject to 
errors through misidentification (Shoemaker, 1968). Furthermore, 
agency reports may only insufficiently assess the pre-reflective, sen-
sorimotor feeling of agency (Tsakiris et al., 2005; Synofzik et al., 
2008a,b), as conscious access to this agency level may be limited. 
Thus, which other variables differ between real and false feedback?
Measures of actual agency IndePendent of exPerIence
Only onset discrepancy between movement and feedback differed 
significantly on real and false feedback trials. This was intended 
by our experimental manipulation, similar to previous work that 
manipulated visual feedback to participants’ movements by intro-
ducing fixed temporal delays (e.g., 60–270 ms, MacDonald and Paus, 
2003; 50–500 ms, Franck et al., 2001). No other measure we had 
assessed differed between real and false feedback conditions (irre-
spective of how they were rated). Especially physiological activity, 
which we had focused on, was not significantly modulated by factual 
agency (i.e., real vs. false feedback). Skin conductance was almost 
identical across conditions, even when examined on the single-
subject level. HR – at least, descriptively – slowed on false feedback 
compared to real feedback (especially when correctly attributed: 
FO < RS), but this was not significant after multiple-comparison 
correction. These results indicate weak somatic associations with 
actual agency. Furthermore, they may be in contrast with evidence 
showing that self-agency, or real feedback to participants’ move-
ments, elicits activation in the anterior insula, which has also been 
implicated with afferents from somatic or visceral sensations of 
t(10) = 5.04, p = 0.001; RS > FS, t(10) = 3.01, p = 0.012, n.s. after 
correcting for multiple comparisons; Table 1]. There were no other 
significant differences between conditions with respect to onset 
RTs. Movement onset did not correlate significantly with overall 
accuracy (r
s
 = 0.362, p = 0.098, n.s.).
teMPoral onset dIscrePancy Between MoveMent and 
feedBack
There was a main effect of feedback condition on onset discrep-
ancy [F(1,20) = 212.45, p < 0.001]. This result, however, should be 
interpreted as manipulation check only, as executed movement and 
visual feedback were identical on real feedback trials (i.e., temporal 
discrepancy = 0), whereas there was an average discrepancy between 
movement and the false feedback of 351 ms (SD = 81 ms). Taking 
into account how onset discrepancies influenced the experience of 
false feedback, smaller temporal discrepancies between executed 
movements and false feedback were associated with incorrect attri-
bution of false feedback [FS < FO, t(10) = −4.03, p = 0.002; Table 1]. 
There were no other significant differences between feedback-by-
rating conditions. Temporal onset discrepancy correlated signifi-
cantly with accuracy (r
s
 = 0.770, p < 0.001).
PhysIologIcal IndIces
Skin conductance response was similarly modulated by real 
(M = 13.8, SD = 7% maximum amplitude) or false feedback 
(M = 13.6, SD = 7% maximum amplitude). Thus, no significant 
effect of feedback on SCRs was found [F(1,16) = 0.17, p = 0.899, 
n.s.]. Even when taking into account how feedback was experi-
enced, no significant SCR differences between conditions were 
found (also evident in Table 1). This is supported by Figure 3, 
which shows that condition-specific SCRs overlap considerably 
and are not consistently modulated in the single participants. SCR 
did not correlate significantly with overall accuracy (r
s
 = −0.130, 
p = 0.606, n.s.).
There also was no significant main effect of feedback on changes 
in HR [F(1,16) = 1.01, p = 0.331, n.s.]. However, Standard deviations 
of HR change were high on both real (M = 0.31, SD = 0.88 bpm) 
and false feedback (M = −0.21, SD = 1.1 bpm). Thus, we had a closer 
look at agency ratings and individual data. False feedback rated as 
other was, by trend, associated with no change or slowing of HR 
compared to the other conditions (Table 1), especially compared to 
correctly attributed real feedback [FO < RS, t(8) = 2.661, p = 0.029, 
n.s.; Figure 5; also visible in six out nine participants in Figure 4]. 
Changes in HR did not correlate significantly with overall accuracy 
(r
s
 = 0.058, p = 0.819, n.s.). Incidentally, when testing single time 
bins, at no time point was HR change correlated with feedback or 
accuracy (all p > 0.376).
dIscussIon
We sought to identify behavioral and physiological variables that 
may index the sense of agency, particularly the pre-reflective feel-
ing of agency, while focusing on skin conductance and HR activity. 
Manipulating the visual feedback to an executed movement, we 
investigated how well each behavioral and physiological variable 
differed between real and false feedback conditions (i.e., between 
factual agency and non-agency), and how they related to the accu-
racy of agency judgments.
Figure 5 | Displayed are mean changes in heart rate compared to 
baseline (in beats per minute), averaged across participants. Error bars 
reflect SEM.
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Physiological activity also did not correlate with accuracy of 
agency judgments. Both measures, SCR and HR, were either not at 
all or not consistently modulated by correctly or incorrectly experi-
enced agency. Moreover, they were not immune to error (e.g., HR 
did not change differently on correct vs. incorrect self-attributions 
of feedback). In that sense, decisions about agency seem different 
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Weike et al., 2007).
conclusIon
Here we sought to identify non-verbal measures of the sense of 
agency. Specifically, we aimed to assess the role of the visceral nerv-
ous system, as measured by skin conductance and HR activity, for 
the feeling of agency. Skin conductance and HR were not differently 
or consistently modulated between actual agency and non-agency 
situations. They informed neither the feeling nor judgments of 
agency. Only discrepancies between movement onset and the onset 
of false visual feedback were related to the experience of agency. 
Although our sample size can be considered small and physiological 
activity is often characterized by high inter-individual variability, we 
conclude that physiological activity does not represent an empirical 
indicator for the feeling of agency. Our results indicate only weak 
visceral–somatic associations with the sense of agency. Thus, despite 
being a phenomenon often considered closely related to states of 
the body, the sense of agency may not have a strong somatic basis, 
in contrast to the sense of body ownership, emotional, or other 
embodied processes. Instead, it rather seems to depend on the mon-
itoring of movements and their predicted sensory consequences 
(e.g., here: onset of visual feedback). This is supported by various 
neuroimaging studies of agency, repeatedly reporting activation in 
mismatch-sensitive regions such as the parietal lobule (Blakemore 
and Sirigu, 2003), as well as by investigations of abnormalities in 
action awareness in patient populations such as schizophrenia 
(Synofzik et al., 2010). In the context of agency, motor-related 
measures (e.g., movement durations, movement adjustments, eye 
movements, etc.) might yield a more promising avenue for future 
research compared to physiological indices, which may, however, 
have the potential to tap into the sense of body ownership.
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the body and interoceptive awareness but also with motor inten-
tion (Roper et al., 1993; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; 
Nahab et al., 2011). Roper et al. (1993), for example, showed that 
lesions to the insula triggered visceral hallucinations as well as unin-
tentional automated movements. Our findings may indicate that, 
first, physiological activity of the visceral nervous system does not 
necessarily correspond to neurophysiological activity of the CNS, 
second, our task was not “somatic enough” (i.e., we investigated 
effects on disembodied or external events in the visual field) or 
that, third, the sense of agency does not rely on somatic events (in 
contrast to, for example, the sense of body ownership – the sense my 
body is moving, voluntarily or involuntarily; Gallagher, 2000). Yet, 
Engbert et al. (2007) showed that the sense of agency is not limited 
to somatic events (i.e., events applied to the participant’s body). 
Other strands of evidence showed that, for example, body-relatd 
activity such as in the insula is specifically crucial for self-awareness 
(Karnath et al., 2005) or that somatic markers may inform an active 
decision-making process (Damasio, 1996). Thus, maybe physiologi-
cal activity was specifically related to agency judgments?
relatIonshIP to accuracy of agency judgMents
Only onset discrepancy correlated significantly with accuracy of 
agency judgments. The temporal difference between movement and 
false feedback onset was greater for correct as opposed to incorrect 
agency judgments (condition FO vs. FS). Thus, onset discrepan-
cies seem to inform agency decisions, which is line with one of the 
dominant explanatory accounts of action awareness: the forward 
model of motor control, which predicts sensory consequences of an 
action via an efference copy, that is, a copy of the motor command 
(von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950). Violations of the predicted or 
intended state by comparison with the actually observed sensory 
feedback, then, may lead to the attribution of another agent as the 
cause of an action (Figure 1), especially the stronger and more sali-
ent incongruence (Wolpert et al., 1995). Previous studies (Franck 
et al., 2001; Leube et al., 2003; MacDonald and Paus, 2003), which 
used fixed feedback delays, demonstrated that longer delays are asso-
ciated with increased detection of false feedback. For example, when 
explicitly instructing participants to attend to onset discrepancies, it 
has been shown that delays as short as 150 ms can be detected so that 
the observed visual event is no longer attributed to the self (Franck 
et al., 2001). In contrast, Farrer et al. (2008) argued that temporal 
properties of movements play a secondary role in the sense of agency. 
We only found partial evidence for Farrer et al. (2008): while here 
bigger temporal delays did lead to the experience of another agent, 
onset times of joystick movements alone were not informative for 
agency. For example, participants may have voluntarily delayed their 
own movement to test for false feedback. The analyses of onset 
times only partially supported this idea, as participants indeed 
initiated their movements later on correctly identified real feed-
back trials. Nonetheless, onsets did not correlate significantly with 
overall accuracy. For example, they were not different for correctly 
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